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Fundamentals of Underwriting
in the Nongroup Health Insurance
Market: Access to Coverage and
Options for Reform
Mark Merlis, Consultant
OVERVIEW — Although the majority of Americans with health insurance
obtain coverage through their employers, many individuals must negotiate
the nongroup insurance market alone. Insurers use a process called medical
underwriting to identify applicants with current or recent medical problems.
Because these applicants are likely to cost the insurer more in claims than a
healthier person, insurers may charge them higher premiums or restrict or
deny coverage. This background paper reviews the practice of underwriting,
state and federal regulation of insurers offering nongroup health coverage,
and several proposed options for improving access to coverage for applicants
who are in poor health.
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Fundamentals of Underwriting
in the Nongroup Health Insurance
Market: Access to Coverage and
Options for Reform

INTRODUCTION
Most nonelderly Americans are covered by employer-sponsored group
health plans. In 2003, however, 16.5 million people—6.5 percent of the
nonelderly population—bought coverage directly from insurers in the
nongroup or individual market.1 Purchasers of nongroup coverage may
include workers in jobs that do not offer health benefits, self-employed
people, and early retirees or other people outside the workforce.
Many proposals to reduce the number of Americans without health insurance would provide tax preferences or other assistance to help more
people without employer benefits buy nongroup coverage. For example,
President Bush’s fiscal year (FY) 2006 budget proposal would provide a
refundable health insurance tax credit for low-income people and,
for higher-income families, an “above-the-line” deduction for highdeductible health coverage bought in conjunction with a health savings
account (HSA).2
The nongroup insurance market has advantages and disadvantages. Buyers can select the benefits they prefer, instead of having to choose among
the limited range of benefit plans—or often a single plan—offered by their
employer. And people with nongroup coverage can keep the same plan if
their circumstances change; they don’t need to join a new insurance plan
if they switch employers. On the other hand, nongroup policies generally
have higher administrative costs than comparable coverage sold to employer groups. In addition, many people seeking nongroup coverage face
one key barrier: medical underwriting.
In all kinds of insurance, underwriting is the process of determining the
level of risk presented by an applicant and deciding whether to sell a
policy and, if so, under what terms and at what price. Nongroup health
insurers commonly obtain information on an applicant’s current health
status, medical history, and other indicators of potential future costs.
An insurer may refuse coverage to high-risk individuals; may grant coverage with an exclusionary rider, under which services for a specific
condition are temporarily or permanently excluded; may impose a
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“preexisting condition exclusion,” which for a fixed period limits coverage of services for any medical condition the purchaser has at the time
coverage takes effect; or may charge higher premium rates to purchasers
perceived to be high risk.
Similar practices once prevailed among insurers selling group health coverage to small employers, usually defined as those with 2 to 50 workers.
Until recently, insurers might reject a group with one or more high-risk
employees; might accept the group but refuse to cover some workers;
and might charge a group with high-risk employees much higher rates
than other groups. Many of these practices are now restricted by federal
and state regulation. There may remain barriers to coverage for high-risk
small groups in some states, particularly those that allow insurers to use
health characteristics to widely vary premium rates for otherwise comparable groups. However, this is just one of many factors in employers’
decisions to offer coverage. In recent years, policy discussions at the federal level have focused chiefly on coverage for people without access to
employer plans. For this reason, the focus in this paper is on practices in
the nongroup market.
This background paper reviews underwriting in the nongroup market:
why insurers underwrite, how they obtain health information, and the
types of restrictions they may impose on individual applicants. It summarizes current federal and state rules governing underwriting practices
and gives an overview of the very limited information available on how
many potential buyers encounter higher premiums or denial or limitation of coverage for health reasons. Finally, it reviews a range of policy
options that could make coverage more available and affordable for highrisk people.
As will be seen, most of the options involve some form of indirect transfer of funds from low-risk people (or taxpayers generally) to high-risk
people. Some analysts think it would be more efficient simply to provide direct subsidies to high-risk people to help defray their higher premiums. Others think that tweaking the nongroup market will not help
it serve high-risk people and that coverage is better provided through
expanded public programs. This report is not intended to endorse any
particular approach; it is meant to provide background on the options
that are currently receiving the most attention from policymakers.

BASICS OF UNDERWRITING
Underwriting is common in all forms of insurance, not just health insurance. For example, an automobile insurer will charge higher rates to young,
unmarried males, or it may refuse coverage to drivers with a history of
accidents. Fire insurers may inspect properties, offer reduced premiums
for safety features such as sprinkler systems, and so on.
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Why Do Insurers Underwrite?
Two key considerations govern an insurer’s behavior:
■ People are more likely to buy insurance if they have reason to believe

they will incur high costs in the near future.
This phenomenon is known as “adverse selection.” Nongroup health
insurers must be aware that people may wait until they are sick before
they start shopping for coverage.
■ A small proportion of the insured population accounts for a very

large share of total claims costs.
Among nonelderly adults with employer group coverage in 2001, for
example, the highest-spending 3 percent of enrollees accounted for 37
percent of total costs; the highest-spending 10 percent accounted for 60
percent of total costs.3 In a competitive market, an insurer that could screen
out the highest risks could offer lower rates to more favorable risks.
No insurer can identify in advance everyone who will have high costs.
Many people will have high spending because of some unforeseeable condition or event. However, an insurer can predict that people who have
certain medical problems at the time they apply for coverage will, on
average, cost more than people who don’t have those problems. Table 1
compares spending in 2001 for adults with employer coverage who did
or did not have a history of cancer, diabetes, and/or heart disease as of
the start of the year. (This is not, of course, a full list of the conditions
insurers consider in underwriting, but it allows for a simplified model of
how underwriting works.) The table is based on the Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS) conducted by the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality (AHRQ). The MEPS provides nationally representative data

TABLE 1
Private Insurance Payments, 2001, for People with and without
Cancer, Diabetes, and/or Heart Disease at Start of Year
Health Condition
Cancer, diabetes,
and/or heart disease

Percent of population
Percent of total spending
Per capita payments

None

Total

9%

91%

100%

34%

66%

100%

$11,194

$2,266

$3,092

Source: Author’s analysis of data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), Agency for
Healthcare Quality Research; available at www.meps.ahrq.gov. Population estimates are for
noninstitutionalized people aged 18 to 64 who had employer coverage throughout 2001, who had Medicare at no time during that year, and who participated in MEPS in both 2000 and 2001. Spending figures
include private insurance spending only and have been adjusted for age and sex.
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on health care utilization and spending, insurance coverage, and other
characteristics of the civilian noninstitutionalized population.
After adjustment for age and sex differences, average private insurance
payments for people who had one or more of the three conditions at the
start of the year were nearly five times as high as for people who did not.4
An insurer that accepted all applicants and charged everyone the same
rate would have to charge an annual premium of $3,092 (plus administrative costs and profit). An insurer that could screen out people with the three
conditions or set their premiums separately could offer the applicants without these conditions a premium of $2,266, nearly 27 percent less.
If everyone—healthy or sick—were equally likely to buy insurance, and
if only one insurer were seeking their business, that insurer could accept
every eligible participant at a uniform price. This is approximately the
situation in very large employer groups. It is often thought that this has
something to do with the size of the group: a large employer has a mix of
low-risk and high-risk workers, and the insurer can simply charge all of
them an average price. In fact the size of the group is only one factor, and
perhaps not the most important one.
If an insurer were to set up a booth on the premises of a firm with 100,000
employees and offer to sell coverage to anyone who passed by, this would
not be inherently different from setting up a booth to sell nongroup coverage in the center of a city with 100,000 people. The insurer would have
to expect, in both cases, that the people who actually stopped by the booth
and bought coverage were the highest risks and charge them accordingly.
But there are at least three characteristics of large employer groups that
allow an insurer to forgo underwriting:
■ Individual employees pay only part of the premium for health insur-

ance; in 2004, 77 percent of employers paid at least 75 percent of the cost
for single workers, and 21 percent paid the entire cost.5 Because coverage
is so heavily discounted, from the employee’s perspective, low-risk
employees are almost as likely to enroll as high-risk employees.
■ The transaction is not initiated by the individual employee, nor does

the employee decide when he or she will begin coverage. In the nongroup market, people must make some effort to seek out the insurer and
decide when to do so; it is reasonable, then, for the insurer to be concerned that the purchaser who is knocking on its door could be planning
for surgery tomorrow. In the group market, however, every eligible
employee is uniformly offered coverage on a fixed day (such as the first
day of work), or during a limited annual open season, and must affirmatively accept or refuse coverage at that time. This process also increases
the likelihood that low-risk as well as high-risk employees will enroll.
■ Members of employer groups are, by definition, healthy enough to

work, so their average health status is likely to be better than that of the
general population. Of course, this is not necessarily true of dependents
or of people buying coverage from the group as a result of the 1996
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Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) continuation rules (described below).
This is not to say that the size of the group is unimportant. The key
factors cited—subsidized premiums, ease of participation, and better
health status—apply in small firms as well as large ones. In a small firm,
however, a few high-cost participants could easily raise the average cost
for the entire group; in a larger pool, there is a greater likelihood that
this cost would be offset by many low-risk participants. Moreover, insurers may be concerned that some very small employers would be
motivated to buy health insurance because the owner (or a dependent)
needs expensive care.
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Some insurers are
now reducing the role
of agents by using
“teleunderwriting” to
supplement or replace
the written application.

How Do Insurers Obtain Information?
Most people seeking nongroup coverage buy it through an insurance agent
or broker. In recent years, increasing numbers of policies have been sold
through the Internet; the largest online vendor, eHealthInsurance, claims
to have sold over 500,000 policies. No matter how the sale is facilitated,
the starting point for the underwriting process is the application form,
which commonly includes questions on medical history and other subjects.
The insurer may ask about pregnancy; medication use; alcohol, drug, and
tobacco use; and the occurrence of any of a long list of diseases, conditions,
and symptoms, either during some number of years prior to the application
or ever in the applicant’s life. Insurers may also want to know about highrisk activities, such as motorcycle riding, and may ask whether the applicant
has ever received a negative decision—including rejection, restricted coverage, or substandard rating—from any other life or health insurer.
Agents often help applicants complete applications, and their role in
this process can involve some conflicts of interest. Agents want to sell
coverage and earn a commission, so they may steer applicants toward
the insurers most likely to accept them or even encourage applicants to
withhold some information. On the other hand, insurers may rely on
agents to screen out applicants who appear to be in poor health or have
observable problems.6
Some insurers are now reducing the role of agents by using “teleunderwriting” to supplement or replace the written application. With this
method, the applicant would speak to a trained interviewer who follows
a computer-assisted script that highlights key issues and probes for further details. Teleunderwriting vendors claim that people reveal information more readily over the phone and that agents are relieved not to have
to ask sensitive questions.7
Insurers may make their coverage and rating decisions directly on the
basis of the application or other self-reported information, or they may use
it to identify areas of concern in need of follow-up. If an applicant has
reported a particular condition, insurers may ask for an “attending
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physician statement” from the doctor who has been treating that condition. More rarely, they may arrange for blood or urine testing. Lately some
insurers have been asking for an oral fluid test, whereby an insurance agent
collects fluids from the applicant’s mouth with the use of a swab; the test
can reveal HIV infection or undisclosed tobacco use, for example.8 In rare
instances, the insurer may require a full physical, although this is much
more common in life and disability insurance than in health insurance.
It is always possible that an applicant may not respond fully or truthfully
to questions on the application. If the insurer later discovers a misrepresentation or omission, it has the right to rescind or restrict a policy.9 However,
this is much more costly than identifying such applicants prospectively,
because after the sale of a plan the insurer will already have paid a commission and incurred other administrative costs. For this reason, many insurers are screening applicants using large population-level databases.
The best known of these is maintained by the Medical Insurance Bureau
(MIB), a membership organization that facilitates the exchange of information on insurance applicants among 500 life, health, and disability insurance companies. Each company reports to MIB on individuals who
have applied for any form of coverage and on possible medical conditions or other risk indicators identified for each applicant. (Applicants
agree to have this information released to MIB, so privacy requirements
are not violated.) When another company receives an application from
the same individual, it can query the MIB database and learn what conditions have been reported; histories are generally retained for seven years.
MIB information consists only of condition codes, without further history or details, and companies do not report the action taken on applications. The inquiring underwriter may use the data as a basis for further
investigation or to identify omissions from application forms. MIB has
records on over 30 million individuals and has information on medical
conditions for 16 to 18 million.10
Although MIB information is limited to people who have applied for some
form of individual insurance, other sources are beginning to emerge that
can provide data on a larger share of the population. For example, many
insurers that provide prescription drug benefits to either groups or individuals contract with pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) to administer
those benefits. Several firms are collecting individual drug utilization information from one or more PBMs and making it available to life and
health insurers. An applicant’s use of medications may reveal chronic
conditions, such as high blood pressure or depression. (There are concerns that these matches may be misleading, as when someone trying to
stop smoking briefly takes an antidepressant.11) Firms offering drug profiles report “hit rates”—matches of applicants to PBM records—of 30 percent or more. 12 Because so many people receive prescription drugs, it is
possible that insurers might, in the future, have information on much of
the population.
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Although the focus of this report is on underwriting and its effects, it should
be noted that there are other ways in which insurers can discourage enrollment by high-risk applicants. Health plans can offer policies that include
benefits thought to attract younger and healthier enrollees, such as well
child care, and limit benefits, such as prescription drugs or home health
care, that are more likely to appeal to people with chronic illnesses. One
type of benefit that may be especially subject to manipulation is mental
health care; plans competing in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) had frequently tinkered with mental health benefits to reduce adverse selection until these practices were restricted in 1999.13 Health
insurers can also tailor their marketing approaches to appeal to more desirable applicants. For example, it has been alleged that some plans
participating in early Medicare health maintenance organization (HMO)
contracting initiatives targeted their outreach to healthy seniors.14
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Problems commonly
subject to exclusion
riders include chronic
back pain and anemia.

How May Insurers Respond to High-Risk Applicants?
When an insurer identifies a high-risk applicant or a specific condition or
problem that may lead to high costs, it may respond in a number of ways.
Many of the practices discussed in this section have been restricted in at
least some states or, for specified populations, by federal law; current
rules are described later in this paper. In an unregulated environment,
nongroup insurers may behave as follows:
Denial of coverage — An insurer could simply refuse to sell a policy to
an applicant or, in the case of a family, exclude one or more family members from the policy.
Riders and exclusions — An insurer could sell a policy with a rider that
excludes coverage for some specific medical condition or for some body part,
either during a fixed “elimination” period (for example, during the first year
of coverage) or for as long as the policy is in effect. Problems commonly
subject to exclusion riders include chronic back pain and anemia.15
Policies may also include a “preexisting condition exclusion.” This provision excludes coverage for any condition which was diagnosed or for
which the policyholder received treatment during some period before
the policy took effect. A preexisting condition clause has two components.
The first is the “look-back” period: the length of time before the policy
effective date, to which the exclusion applies. For example, if the lookback period were 12 months, an applicant who had been treated for a
gallbladder problem during that period would be ineligible for coverage
of any new or continuing gallbladder problem; an applicant whose last
treatment for the problem occurred more than 12 months earlier, however, would be covered. The second component is duration: how long the
exclusion lasts after the policy takes effect. If a policy is referred to as
having a 12-month/6-month exclusion, this means that the look-back
period is 12 months and the exclusion applies for the first 6 months after
the policy effective date.
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Although exclusion riders are imposed for specific problems known to
the insurer at the time the policy is issued, general preexisting condition
exclusions apply whether the insurer knew about the problem or not. If
someone buys a policy and shortly thereafter files a claim for diabetes
treatment, the insurer may suspect that the patient was already receiving
treatment before the policy took effect. If this is confirmed, for example
through contact with the treating physician, the exclusion will apply and
the claim will be denied.
Substandard rating — An insurer may offer coverage to someone with
medical problems only at a premium rate that is higher than the rate offered to comparable individuals without any problems. The term “comparable” must be emphasized. Insurers commonly vary premiums for
the same benefit package according to the enrollee’s age and sex, geographic location, and sometimes other factors not directly related to health
status, such as whether the policy was issued directly or through an association plan. One national study found that in 2000, the average monthly
nongroup premium for a healthy 55-year-old male was $313, compared
to an average of $132 for a healthy 25-year-old male; the premium for the
older male was 2.4 times as high as for his younger counterpart.16 Despite
this gap, each of these enrollees paid a standard rate for someone with his
demographic characteristics. An insurer is imposing a substandard rate
when it charges a 25-year-old person with health problems more than a
healthy one.

How Many People Are Affected by Underwriting?
It is difficult to gauge how many people face barriers to coverage or how
many people are uninsured because of underwriting and rating practices
in the nongroup market. Although there have been a number of studies
of the practices of particular insurers or groups of insurers in the nongroup
market, there is no information on the prevalence of various practices in
the industry as a whole. Moreover, different insurers may treat identical
applicants differently, so an applicant unable to find coverage with one
carrier may find affordable insurance through another. Finally, many other
considerations may limit the number of otherwise uninsured people
who buy nongroup coverage, including high costs (even before any
health-related premium differential) and lack of information about available options.
Insurer practices — In a 2001 study, Pollitz, Sorian, and Thomas submitted applications for seven fictitious applicants, each with one or more
preexisting conditions, to multiple insurers in eight different markets. They
received a total of 60 insurance decisions per applicant. 17 One HIVpositive applicant was rejected by every insurer in every market. A young
woman with hay fever and no other problem was rejected 8 percent of
the time. Most of the offers made to applicants involved benefit restrictions, higher than standard rates, or both. One striking finding was that
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different insurers in the same market treated identical applicants very differently; someone rejected by some carriers might
receive a “clean” offer—unrestricted coverage at standard
rates—from others. In total, 35 percent of the applications were
rejected and only 12 percent received clean offers. Of course,
this does not represent the insurers’ overall negative action rates,
because all the hypothetical applicants had at least some health
problem, whereas the broader pool of real applicants would
include people with no problems.
The Health Insurance Association of America (now called
America’s Health Insurance Plans, or AHIP) surveyed 11 of its
member insurers and obtained the insurers’ responses to about
half a million individual applications. As Table 2 shows, the
surveyed insurers rejected about 12 percent of applicants and
made clean offers to 71 percent; the remaining applicants were
offered coverage with an exclusion waiver, a substandard premium, or both.
Other surveys have shown similar results. A 1996 study by the
General Accounting Office (GAO, now known as the Government Accountability Office) collected data from one or more
individual health insurers in seven markets. The carriers studied typically rejected 18 percent of applicants, with one carrier
rejecting 33 percent.18
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TABLE 2
Reported Action on Applications,
11 Nongroup Health Insurers

Action

Percent of
Applications

Standard offer

71.2%

Extra premium

5.9%

Exclusion waiver
Extra premium & waiver
Declined

13.5%
2.8%
11.8%

Source: Thomas Musco and Thomas Wildsmith, “Individual
Health Insurance: Access and Affordability,” (Health Insurance Association of America Brief Analysis, October 2002;
available at www.heartland.org/pdf/15320.pdf. Figures add up
to more than 100 percent because multiple actions are possible
when an application is for several individuals. Results are for
underwritten applications only; some applications never
reached this stage because the application was either incomplete or withdrawn, or for other reasons.

People with a history of mental health problems may face greater barriers
to coverage. A 2002 study of seven carriers by GAO found that people with
mental disorders of “generally moderate severity” would be rejected 52
percent of the time, whereas people with comparably severe chronic health
conditions would be rejected 30 percent of the time.19
In another recent study, Pauly and Nichols reported data on rate offers
by one large insurer in a single state. This insurer rejected 14 percent of
applicants. Of those offered coverage, 66 percent were offered the standard rate; 24 percent were offered a rate at 125 percent of the standard
and 7 percent were offered 177 percent of the standard; the remaining 3
percent were offered some undisclosed higher rate.20 The 1996 GAO study
found one nongroup carrier that charged about 2 percent of enrollees 100
percent more than the standard rates. The insurers in these two studies
appear to have used twice the standard rate as an upper limit. Note, however, that this is twice a standard that may already be high because of
age, sex, and local health care costs. One of the hypothetical applicants in
the Pollitz, Sorian, and Thomas study, a 62 year-old male with controlled
high blood pressure, received offers ranging from $244 to $2,504 per
month, depending on the area and the insurer.
Consumer experiences — A critique of the Pollitz, Sorian, and Thomas
study by the National Association of Health Underwriters emphasized
that applicants usually could have found some coverage in each market
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and noted that benefit restrictions and rate increases were not always
significant. A response by Pollitz and Levitt notes that the fact that some
insurer(s) in an area might offer affordable coverage doesn’t mean that a
consumer can find (or access) that insurer.21
Why would different insurers in the same market reach different decisions about the same applicant? Underwriting involves a tension between
avoiding undesirable risks and maximizing enrollment. An insurer that
rejected every applicant who had ever had any medical problem might
avoid most bad risks but would not sell many policies. Each insurer has
its own strategies for balancing risk management and sales. One observer
suggests that the entire industry has shifted strategies over time. In this
view, tight underwriting predominated in the 1980s; in the 1990s, insurers loosened underwriting to maximize volume; more recently, standards
have again become more strict.22 However, there are no longitudinal data
to confirm this impression.
In any case, variation in insurers’ strategies means that studies of insurers cannot indicate how many people are actually affected by underwriting. There is surprisingly little direct data on consumer experiences. A
2001 survey by the Commonwealth Fund found that about 27 percent of
working age adults had shopped for insurance in the nongroup market
in the preceding three years. Of these, 53 percent had found it “very difficult or impossible” to find a plan they could afford; the figure was 62
percent for people who had specified medical problems or who had reported being in fair or poor health, compared to 46 percent for people
with no medical conditions and who reported good or excellent health.
Although this certainly suggests that people with health problems face
greater barriers, what people think they can “afford” depends on their
income, desire for coverage, and other factors. Actual denials of coverage
were considerably less frequent than suggested by the data from insurers: only 4 percent of shoppers had experienced a denial. 23
The MEPS also asks whether respondents have ever been denied health
insurance because of poor health. In 2001, less than 1 percent of those
asked the question said that they had.24 (This is similar to the Commonwealth finding: 4 percent of 27 percent who shopped equals 1 percent.
However, Commonwealth asked only about the last three years, whereas
MEPS asked about any denial ever.) There is no way of knowing, however, how many people were discouraged from applying (by agents or by
an intimidating questionnaire) or how many were not actually denied
but received a substandard offer.
Because the number of people looking for nongroup coverage is limited,
and because many potential purchasers would be deterred by high costs
regardless of underwriting, the population actually affected is relatively
small—perhaps 1 million or more people could be regarded as “uninsurable.” But many millions of people who have insurance now and who
have a history of health problems may be concerned that, if their circumstances should change and they lose their current coverage, an affordable
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replacement may be difficult or impossible to find. In the early 1990s, there
was considerable discussion of “job lock”: the possibility that some people
who would otherwise have changed jobs, shifted into self-employment or
part-time work, or taken early retirement had remained in their current job
in order to retain group health coverage. Although anecdotes suggested
that this phenomenon was real, it has proved difficult to quantify.25
In 1996, Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The “portability” provisions, summarized in the next
section, were intended to address job lock by assuring that people who
left a job from which they had had health coverage would be able to obtain it, either through their new employer’s health plan or in the nongroup
market. However, there has been no post-HIPAA study to see how well
these protections have worked.
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In the late 1980s, states
began to regulate underwriting and the
rate-setting practices
of insurers that sold coverage to small groups.

EXISTING REGULATION OF NONGROUP INSURERS
Responsibility for regulation of health insurance and employee health benefits has traditionally been divided between the federal government and
the states. Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, Congress affirmed
that the sale of insurance was not interstate commerce and that the “business of insurance” was to be regulated by the states. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974—meant to strengthen federal
regulation of pension plans—preempted state regulation of employee benefits, including health benefit plans. States can regulate commercial
insurers, HMOs, and other entities selling health insurance, whether to
individuals or to employers. However, they cannot regulate self-insured
employer health plans. (Under a self-insured plan, the employer assumes
direct risk for employees’ health care costs. A self-insured plan may contract with an insurer to process claims under an administrative service agreement. It may also obtain reinsurance to cover unexpectedly high costs; see
the section on reinsurance below.)
Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many states began to regulate
underwriting and the rate-setting practices of insurers that sold coverage
to small groups, commonly defined as employers with 2 to 50 workers.
(Some states included one-person firms, thus extending protections to selfemployed individuals.) A few states enacted similar regulations in the
nongroup market. However, these were and are more controversial than
small group reforms because of concerns that measures to improve availability of coverage for high-risk people would drive up premiums for the
majority of lower-risk buyers. (This issue is also discussed further below.)
As noted earlier, HIPAA represented the first major federal intervention
in the health insurance market. HIPAA prohibits or regulates underwriting practices of self-insured employers, insurers selling group coverage,
and, to a more limited extent, insurers selling nongroup coverage. This
section begins with a review of HIPAA requirements for the nongroup
market and then summarizes state regulations.
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HIPAA Nongroup Market Rules
HIPAA’s nongroup market rules are chiefly related to insurers’ treatment
of applicants who were previously covered under an employer group
plan. Some HIPAA rules apply to all nongroup coverage.
Guaranteed issue and preexisting condition exclusions — A nongroup
insurer may not deny coverage to, or impose any preexisting condition
exclusion on, a HIPAA-eligible individual, defined as a person who has
18 months of “creditable” health coverage and whose most recent health
coverage was through a group plan. 26 Creditable coverage includes any
form of public or private health insurance (with minor exceptions). The
coverage need not have been continuous, but there cannot have been a
break in coverage of more than 63 days, and the most recent period of
coverage cannot have ended more than 63 days before the date on which
the individual applies for nongroup coverage. Insurers need not offer
“HIPAA eligibles” every policy they sell, but they must make at least two
product choices available.
The guaranteed issue rule does not apply in a state that has developed an
alternative method of assuring that HIPAA-eligible people have access to
a choice of health plans. Alternatives can include state guaranteed issue
requirements applicable to some or all carriers, provisions for conversion
coverage (see below), or at least one nongroup plan offering open enrollment. States can also meet the requirement by offering a high-risk pool.
These pools, described later in this paper, are commonly designed for
people denied nongroup coverage for health reasons; HIPAA eligibles
may join the same pool or be separately grouped.
One major gap in HIPAA’s guaranteed issue requirement is that it does
not include any regulation of premium rates. A nongroup insurer must
offer coverage to a HIPAA-eligible individual, but it can deter enrollment
by charging HIPAA eligibles much higher rates than other applicants.
HIPAA requires states that have developed an alternative compliance
method to assure that coverage is affordable, for example, by regulating
insurers’ rating practices or offering subsidies to individuals or carriers.
In states where only the federal rules apply, there is no such protection.
Guaranteed renewability — A nongroup carrier cannot cancel or refuse
to renew coverage for any individual, regardless of HIPAA eligibility
status, except for failure to pay premiums or fraud. An insurer that
wishes to cease to offer nongroup coverage in a state may cancel all
existing policies with 6 months’ notice; an insurer that wants to discontinue a particular policy in a state, but not leave the nongroup market,
must offer holders of that policy any other plan that it is selling in the
state. Here again, HIPAA does not restrict rating practices. An insurer
must offer renewal coverage, but it can raise premiums at the time of
renewal for people who are in poor health or who have incurred high
costs. (Many states, however, limit the extent to which renewal rates
can vary by health status.)
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State Regulation
Nearly all states have adopted at least some restrictions on underwriting
or rating practices of nongroup insurers. Table 3 shows the number of states
that had adopted each of the major types of protections as of April 2004.
Guaranteed issue — In five states, every nongroup insurer is required
to accept every applicant. Another 12 states require guaranteed issue
by one or more specific insurers (for example, a Blue Cross/Blue Shield
plan), by a class of insurers (such as all licensed HMOs), or for specific
populations, such as people who have previously held creditable insurance coverage for some period but do not
meet the HIPAA eligibility requirements.
TABLE 3
Finally, 11 states require guaranteed isNumber of States with Nongroup Market Rules, 2004
sue only for HIPAA eligibles. (The remaining states have adopted alternative
No. of
mechanisms for assuring access to covRequirement
States
erage for HIPAA eligibles.)
Guaranteed Issue
Conversion coverage — Most states
For all carriers and all applicants ................................... 5
require insurers who sell coverage to emFor some carriers or specified populations .................. 12
ployer groups to offer people who are
leaving the group an opportunity to buy
For HIPAA eligibles only ............................................... 11
an individual policy, even if the insurer is
not otherwise selling nongroup coverage.
Conversion Coverage .................................................. 38
Conversion coverage differs from the
HIPAA portability protections in several
Exclusions
ways. People may qualify for conversion
Riders restricted or prohibited
without meeting the HIPAA standard of
For all carriers .......................................................... 13
18 months of creditable coverage. Only
For some carriers or HIPAA eligibles .................. 16
the insurer covering the person’s previous group must offer the coverage. A few
Preexisting conditions
states limit the premium rate insurers can
Limited lookback/duration period ....................... 48
charge for a conversion policy, for exDuration reduced through credit
ample, no more than 120 percent of the
for prior coverage .................................................... 40
previous group rate; however, the new
policy will generally not be as extensive
Rating Requirements
as the employer plan.
Pure community ............................................................... 3
Conversion is also distinct from another
Adjusted community ....................................................... 6
insurance option for people leaving
Rating bands ................................................................... 12
group plans: federally required COBRA
continuation coverage. Under COBRA,
people leaving a group plan for specified
Self-employed individual as small group ................... 12
reasons (change or loss of employment,
divorce, disability, and so on) must be
Source: Author’s analysis, based on Georgetown University Health Policy Institute, “Sumallowed to continue participation in the
mary of Key Consumer Protections in Individual Health Insurance Markets,” April 2004;
available at http://healthinsuranceinfo.net/newsyoucanuse/discrimination_limits.pdf. The
identical coverage for a fixed period—
categorization and counts of states are the author’s and should not be attributed to the source.
usually 18 months, or longer for certain
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people. This requirement applies to self-insured employer plans as well as
those offered through an insurer. The enrollee can be charged a premium
of no more than 102 percent of the cost of the plan (150 percent in the case
of disabled people with extended coverage). The terms and price of
COBRA coverage may be more attractive than a conversion policy. However, a conversion policy is guaranteed renewable, whereas COBRA coverage cannot be extended past the applicable time period. In addition,
COBRA applies only to firms with 20 or more workers. However, most
states have enacted “mini-COBRA” laws (separate from their conversion
rules) that apply comparable rules to firms of 2 to 19 workers.27
Exclusion riders and preexisting condition exclusions — In 13 states,
insurers are prohibited from issuing any coverage with exclusion riders;
in 16 other states, riders are prohibited only for specific carriers or for
HIPAA eligibles. Most states limit preexisting condition exclusions by
setting maximum lookback periods, exclusion durations, or both. Permitted lookback periods are commonly 12 or 24 months; there is considerable variation in allowable duration of the exclusion, from as few as 3
months after enrollment to as many as 84 months. Most states require
that the duration of the exclusion be reduced for people with prior coverage. For example, in a state that allows a 12-month exclusion, someone
who had been covered elsewhere for 9 months before joining the plan
would be subject to the exclusion for only 3 months.
Premium rate regulations — As of 2004, 21 states had restrictions on the
extent to which nongroup insurers could vary premiums according to
the health status or medical history of enrollees. Only three states require
“pure” community rating under which, for a given package of health
benefits, the insurer must offer the same premium to each enrollee, regardless of health, age, sex, geography, or other factors. Another six states
permit adjusted or modified community rating, whereby an insurer may
not use health as a rating factor but may consider age, sex, or geography
(often within some limits). The remaining states use rating bands, whereby
the insurer may vary rates according to health status, but only within
specified limits. For example, the state may specify that the rate charged
to an individual for health-related reasons cannot be more than 25 percent higher or lower than the standard rate offered to otherwise comparable enrollees. Some states allow unlimited variation for other factors
and limit only the health-related variation. Others have overall limits on
variation by health, age, and sex.
Self-employed people as small groups — Nearly all states regulate insurance practices in the small group market. Although small groups are
usually defined as those with 2 to 50 employees, 12 states include groups
of 1: self-employed individuals with no other employees. Small group
insurers, in this case, must offer coverage to these individuals, and the
requirements for insurers, especially in the area of premium rating, are
often more stringent than those applicable to nongroup insurers.
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IMPROVING ACCESS TO COVERAGE
Policymakers and analysts have proposed a number of possible solutions
to the problems encountered by individuals seeking insurance outside the
group market. Among these are tightly regulating insurers, creating and
subsidizing high-risk pools, using reinsurance to cover losses incurred by
high-cost individuals, creating of large pools of both high-risk and lowrisk applicants, and encouraging more low-risk people to enter the market.
Discussed here are the merits and drawbacks of these options.

Stronger Regulation of Insurers
More states could require guaranteed issue of insurance, restrict the use
of exclusion riders and preexisting condition exclusions, or limit healthrelated variation in premium rates. Similarly, the federal government could
adopt rules for a broader population than that covered by HIPAA.
Guaranteed issue or limits on exclusions would make coverage available
to high-risk people, but—in the absence of rating reforms—only at a very
high cost. As illustrated in Table 1, an insurer that charges separate rates
to applicants with and without a history of cancer, diabetes, or heart disease at the time of application would charge the higher-risk applicants
$11,194, compared to $2,266 for the lower-risk applicants. Coverage would
nominally be available to the higher-risk group, but it would be financially out of reach for most potential purchasers.
Rating restrictions would alleviate this problem but would raise rates for
lower-risk buyers. Table 4 shows how rates would change under a 50 percent rating band, that is, a requirement that premiums could not be more
than 50 percent higher or lower than the standard rate for health reasons.

TABLE 4
Effect of 50 Percent Rating Band on Rates for
Nonelderly People with and without Cancer, Diabetes,
and/or Heart Disease, 2001
Health Condition
Cancer, diabetes,
and/or heart disease

None

$11,194

$2,266

Premium with 50 percent rating band

$7,827

$2,609

Percent change

– 30%

15%

Premium without rating restriction

Source: Author’s analysis of MEPS. Population estimates are for noninstitutionalized people aged 18 to
64 who had employer coverage throughout 2001, who had Medicare at no time during that year, and who
participated in MEPS in both 2000 and 2001. Spending figures include private insurance spending only
and have been adjusted for age and sex.
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Note that this requirement does not mean that the highest premium can be
no more than 1.5 times the lowest premium. If the standard rate were
$100 per month, the maximum would be $150 and the minimum would
be $50, allowing a three-to-one ratio.
The 9 percent of enrollees with the three conditions in the example would
see their premiums reduced from $11,194 to $7,827. (These premiums do
not include an allowance for administrative costs or profit.) But this reduction would be financed by charging higher premiums to the 91 percent of enrollees without these conditions. They would see a 15 percent
increase, from $2,266 to $2,609.
Assuming that lower-risk people have a lower propensity to buy insurance, some might decide that coverage was too costly and would drop
out of the pool. This could mean that there would be fewer low-risk participants to cross-subsidize the high-risk enrollees. Rates would then be
further increased to make up the difference, driving even more low-risk
people out of the pool. This kind of cycle of rate increases and deterioration of the average risk level in an insurance pool is known as a “selection
spiral,” or, in the extreme case, a “death spiral.” Ultimately the insurer
could wind up with only a few very high-risk participants paying very
high premiums.
Did these hypothetical outcomes actually occur in the states that have
adopted comprehensive reforms in the nongroup market? Although numerous studies of the effects of state reform measures have been conducted,
none has entirely succeeded in isolating the effects of reform laws from
other factors that may have affected insurance coverage in a given state,
such as the state’s economic performance. One synthesis of the available
research by Fuchs finds that, in states with strict regulation, high-risk people
are more likely to obtain coverage. However, enough low-risk people leave
the nongroup market that the overall number of people with health insurance actually declines. The effects were less pronounced in states that
phased-in reforms gradually—avoiding a sudden rate shock—and in states
that used rating bands instead of pure community rating.28 Whether the
reforms are perceived as successful overall may depend on whether one’s
policy priorities are to maximize access for high-risk people or to maximize the proportion of the population with coverage.
Proponents of regulation contend that selection effects could be reduced
if low-risk people were encouraged to remain in the pool, for example,
through tax credits or other subsidies that would reduce their net premiums. Some proposals would even mandate that every individual obtain
some form of coverage, thereby ensuring there would be enough lowrisk purchasers in the nongroup market to cross-subsidize higher-risk
buyers. These options will be considered further below.
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High-Risk Pools
High-risk pools are state-operated or state-chartered programs that offer
subsidized coverage to individuals who cannot obtain affordable coverage in the nongroup market. In many states, the high-risk pool also serves
as the mechanism for assuring availability of coverage to HIPAA-eligible
individuals (those with prior group coverage).
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Even after subsidies,
risk-pool premiums
can be quite high.

In 2003, 31 states operated high-risk pools, with enrollment estimated at
172,845.29 An insurer may refer the applicant to a state-operated pool, or
individuals may apply to the pool on their own. Applicants must demonstrate that they have been denied coverage for health-related reasons by
one or more insurers; some states allow enrollment by people who have
been offered coverage only at very high rates. Premiums paid by risk pool
enrollees are typically capped between 125 and 200 percent of the “standard” premium—that is, the premium that nongroup carriers might charge
an applicant of the same age and sex without medical problems.
Because the pools are designed to attract the highest-risk applicants, even
these higher premiums are insufficient to meet claims costs. One source
estimates that premiums cover about 55 percent of costs in an average
pool.30 Every pool relies on some form of additional funding to subsidize
pool losses. Most commonly, health insurers in the state pay an assessment based on their share of total health insurance premiums earned in
the state.31 Currently, the level of assessment is usually around 1 percent
of total premiums charged by the carriers.32 Some states also use general
revenues, tobacco settlement money, or other special funds.
If a high-risk pool were supported solely through assessments paid by
nongroup insurers, the effect would be identical to that of the rating reforms illustrated in Table 4. In order to provide the necessary subsidies,
insurers would have to raise rates for the lower-risk purchasers of
nongroup coverage, which could also lead to a selection spiral. To avoid
this, most states that use assessments to fund their pools require participation by insurers selling group health coverage as well as nongroup insurers. Spreading the costs across the broader population of purchasers
of group and nongroup policies reduces the per capita premium increases
insurers must impose to pay their assessments. However, because ERISA
preempts state regulation of employee benefit plans, states cannot require
contributions from self-insured employer health plans. In 2004, 54 percent of enrollees in employer plans were in fully or partially self-insured
plans, meaning that a substantial share of the privately insured population is exempt from participating directly in any subsidy arrangement
for high-risk individuals.33
Even after subsidies, risk-pool premiums can be quite high. In 2003, the
median pool rate for a 35-year-old female nonsmoker was $4,287 per year;
in one state the rate was $8,352. For a 53-year-old male nonsmoker, the
median rate was $6,978 per year; the highest was $13,990.34 Only a few
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states provide any assistance for low-income participants.35 One study found
that premiums in risk-pool states would exceed 10 percent of income for 46
percent of uninsured people and 37 percent of the “uninsurable.”36 Because
subsidy funds are limited, some states also have waiting lists for pool applicants or impose preexisting condition exclusions. As a result of costs,
restrictions on benefits, and waiting periods, state high-risk pools insure
an average of 1.2 percent of those covered by individual insurance.37
One way of broadening the reach of high-risk pools is through some form
of federal subsidy. The Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002
authorized $20 million in seed grants for states newly establishing risk
pools and also provided $40 million per year for fiscal years 2003 and
2004 to be used for state grants to offset up to 50 percent of losses for new
and existing high-risk pools. As of August 2004, 6 states had received
seed grants and 16 received operating grants; grants totaled $34 million
of the $100 million authorized.38 Qualified programs were required to
offer a choice of plans through the pool and limit premiums to 150 percent of standard rates. States also had to show that they had established
some mechanism to continue funding the pool beyond FY 2004; beyond
that time, federal money could not be guaranteed and pools would again
be potentially limited by states’ capacities to raise subsidy funds through
insurer assessments or other revenues.
The Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions has reported S. 288, which would extend the seed grant program and increase
funds for operating grants to $75 million per year through 2009. There
have been a number of proposals for a permanent federal funding stream
for high-risk pools. For example, AHIP has proposed a 50 percent subsidy for all qualifying state pools, along with supplemental funding for
very high-cost pool enrollees. The secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services would be authorized to establish a pool in states
that failed to do so on their own.
A risk pool subsidized through some broad-based federal or state funding
mechanism could make coverage more accessible to high-risk people without unduly increasing the burden on low-risk purchasers. Critics of this
approach note several drawbacks. First, risk pools require that insurers
continue the practice of underwriting, because they must decide which
applicants to accept and which to refer to the risk pool. Underwriting itself
is costly, raising administrative expenses without providing any clear social benefit. Second, if risk pools continue to rely in part on funding through
assessments paid by insurers, the system could actually reinforce rather
than remedy competitive pressures for selective enrollment. An insurer’s
assessment is based on its total premium revenues, rather than on the number of applicants it refers to the high-risk pool. Therefore, an insurer with
more stringent underwriting requirements can offer lower rates to the applicants it accepts, and would in turn make a lower per capita contribution
to the pool than an insurer that has accepted higher-risk applicants.
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One alternative to a high-risk pool is to allow uninsurable people to “buy
in” to a public program, such as Medicare or Medicaid, by paying a premium. The Clinton administration proposed allowing people aged 62 to
64 (and some younger displaced workers) to buy Medicare coverage. Although this proposal did not specifically target the uninsurable, people
just below age 65 may be especially likely to have difficulty obtaining
affordable private coverage. Tennessee’s TennCare program for Medicaid beneficiaries has allowed people to buy in to the program if they were
determined by the state or a state-contracted underwriter to be unable to
obtain private insurance for health reasons. Participants with income
above the federal poverty level pay an income-based premium ranging
from $20 to a maximum of $550 per month. TennCare as a whole has
faced continual financial pressures; a broad package of enrollment cuts
proposed by Governor Bredesen includes eliminating the buy-in option
for uninsurable people above poverty. 39

Reinsurance
A health insurer (or a self-insured employer health plan) can buy reinsurance or stop-loss coverage to limit its potential risks for very high costs.
There are two kinds of stop-loss coverage, individual and aggregate; an
insurer may purchase either or both.
Under individual stop-loss, the reinsurer assumes full or partial liability
when costs for any single enrollee during a year exceed a specified dollar
threshold. The original insurer is usually required to retain at least some
liability for costs above the threshold so that it will have an incentive to
continue managing the patient’s care. For example, the reinsurer might
pay 90 percent of individual expenses in excess of $25,000; if the individual had accumulated $100,000 in bills, the primary insurer would pay
$32,500 ($25,000 plus 10 percent of the remaining $75,000) and the reinsurer would pay $68,500. Under aggregate stop-loss, the reinsurer steps
in when total costs for a whole group of enrollees exceed some limit—for
example, 120 percent of premium revenues.
Reinsurance may be purchased by small to mid-sized self-insured employer plans, for which a handful of high-cost cases could drive total plan
costs above the level the employer finds acceptable. Or, it may be bought
by insurers in the small group or individual market who have a relatively
small number of cases across which to spread risk. In either case, the reinsurer is in effect pooling the risks of a number of smaller primary insuring entities. Although private reinsurance is thought to be common in
health care, there is little data on how many insurers or employers participate in these arrangements or how much risk they are transferring.40
One report suggests that the general reinsurance market tightened after
September 11 and that as many as half of the firms that had been offering
medical reinsurance left the market by 2004; those that remained were
raising premiums and imposing higher loss thresholds.41
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Private reinsurance protects each participating insurer from a high-cost
event or a randomly excessive incidence of such events. Because revenues
from the pool of participants must be enough to cover the reinsurer’s
losses, reinsurance does not reduce the overall cost of insurance. (On the
contrary, it raises costs, because the reinsuring entity has administrative
costs and desires a profit.) Reinsurance merely ensures that no one participant will suffer unduly high losses due to bad luck.
Some states have experimented with subsidized reinsurance programs
for individuals or small groups, under which payments from the participating insurers are supplemented with funds from other sources that help
cover part of the reinsurer’s losses. In Connecticut and Idaho, for example,
the funding mechanism is comparable to that used in many high-risk
pools; losses are covered by assessments on health insurers in the state,
including insurers not participating in the arrangement. The Healthy New
York program uses tobacco settlement funds to provide reinsurance for
carriers selling nongroup coverage to modest-income individuals; the
program assumes 90 percent of costs between $5,000 and $75,000 for any
individual enrollee. In Arizona, the state-subsidized Health Care Group
provides aggregate stop-loss coverage to carriers enrolling small groups
and self-employed individuals; it also helps these carriers buy individual
stop-loss in the commercial market.42
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Although a publicly
subsidized reinsurance
plan can reduce overall premiums, it would
not necessarily remove the incentives
for insurers to avoid
enrolling chronically ill
people.

The health insurance proposal offered by Senator Kerry in his presidential campaign would have created a federal reinsurance program for any
employer group, large or small, that offered coverage to all employees
and met other specific conditions. The program, subsidized through federal general funds, would have covered 75 percent of costs in excess of
$30,000 in 2006, rising to $50,000 in 2013. The plan was designed to reduce employer costs by about 10 percent.43
Some analysts have suggested that a public health reinsurance program
could be modeled on the mortgage insurance offered by the Federal Housing Administration.44 Mortgage insurance protects lenders against losses
in the event that a borrower defaults and the proceeds from a foreclosure
are insufficient to cover the loan balance. This protection for lenders seems
similar to the protection reinsurance provides to health insurers; it is important to note, though, that mortgage lenders also engage in underwriting, attempting to screen out bad credit risks the same way that insurers
screen out bad health risks. Mortgage insurance, like conventional reinsurance, protects against unpredictable risks in a market from which predictable risks have already been screened out.
Although a publicly subsidized reinsurance plan can reduce overall premiums—as any public subsidy could—it would not necessarily remove
the incentives for insurers to avoid enrolling chronically ill people who
can be expected to incur above-average costs. Table 5 (see next page)
shows how rates for people with and without the three high-cost conditions used in the Table 1 example might be affected by a reinsurance
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TABLE 5
Effect of Reinsurance on Average Annual Private Insurer
Payments, 2001, for Nonelderly People with and without
Cancer, Diabetes, and/or Heart Disease at Start of Year
Health Condition
Cancer, diabetes,
and/or heart disease

None

Total

Per capita payments
without reinsurance

$11,194

$2,266

$3,092

Per capita payments
after 75% reinsurance

$ 8,006

$2,184

$2,723

– 28%

– 4%

– 12%

$ 6,943

$2,157

$2,599

– 38%

– 5%

– 16%

Percent change
Per capita payments
after 100% reinsurance
Percent change

Source: Author’s analysis of MEPS. Population estimates are for noninstitutionalized people aged 18 to
64 who had employer coverage throughout 2001, who had Medicare at no time during that year, and who
participated in MEPS in both 2000 and 2001. Spending figures include private insurance spending only
and have been adjusted for age and sex.

scheme comparable to the Kerry proposal. Reinsurance would pay 75
percent of costs for any individual in excess of $25,000. (This threshold is
used, instead of $30,000, because the example uses 2001 dollars.)
Reinsurance would reduce the primary insurer’s average enrollee costs
by about 12 percent, roughly the same proportion estimated for the Kerry
proposal. The reduction would be larger for people with the chronic conditions because they are more likely than others to have costs above the
reinsurance threshold. Even so, the net amount to be paid by the private
insurer would be nearly four times as high for the chronically ill enrollees
as for the others. An insurer who screened out or charged separate rates
to the chronically ill applicants could charge $2,184 for those without
chronic conditions instead of $2,723 if all applicants were charged the
same rate, a difference of nearly 20 percent.
This is partly because many of the chronically ill have expenses above
the reinsurance threshold, and the primary insurer must pay 25 percent
of these costs. However, as the last rows show, even a reinsurance plan
that paid 100 percent of costs above the threshold would leave a considerable incentive for insurers to continue underwriting. Reinsurance reduces, but cannot eliminate, the incentive for underwriting because
it addresses unpredictable risk, whereas underwriting corrects for
predictable risk.
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Broader Pooling
There have been many proposals to bring nongroup purchasers together in
some type of broad pool. Some proposals would either allow individuals
to buy coverage through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program
(FEHBP), which insures over 4 million federal employees and annuitants,
or establish a similar purchasing program specifically for uninsured individuals. President Bush’s FY 2006 budget proposal includes grants to states
to set up pools of this kind.45 Others would allow individuals to form their
own purchasing associations, which would negotiate with insurers on behalf of participants.
In theory, either arrangement could offer less costly coverage, because of
economies of scale and because a larger pool of buyers would have greater
purchasing power with insurers than individuals. However, it is not clear
that either option could in itself improve access for high-risk individuals,
unless it were part of a broader program including subsidies and/or regulation of the existing nongroup market.
FEHBP or similar pools — FEHBP offers participants a choice among
contracting health plans, including several national fee-for-service plans
and, where available, one or more local or regional HMOs. Government
contributions are set through a formula based on a percentage of average plan premiums; enrollees pay the difference between this amount
and the full premium for the plan they have selected. Plans must accept
all FEHBP-eligible applicants and must charge uniform individual and
family rates.
Because the newly covered non-federal individuals or groups would differ from current enrollees, their participation could affect premium rates
for federal employees and annuitants. To avoid this, most proposals to
open FEHBP assume that the new enrollees would be separately pooled—
that is, different premium rates would be established for the non-federal
group. In effect, then, the proposals could construct a parallel health program, using the same contracting health insurers and administration.
An FEHBP-like program would operate in competition with the existing,
largely unregulated nongroup insurance market. Participating plans
would have to guarantee issue and use uniform rates for all non-federal
participants, whereas nongroup carriers outside the system could continue to exclude high-risk applicants and use health-based premium rates.
Although the FEHBP-like program might be able to reduce administrative costs and bargain for lower rates for plans, these factors would almost certainly not be enough to offset the savings nongroup insurers
achieve through underwriting. Healthier people would be able to find
better rates outside the program. The program would likely attract higherrisk enrollees and suffer a selection spiral.
These effects could be reduced if participants in the FEHBP-like program
were offered subsidies not available to people buying coverage outside
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the program. For example, one recent proposal by Davis and Schoen would
provide income-based health insurance tax credits only for participants
in what the authors call the Congressional Health Plan; in addition, rates
under the plan would be reduced through some form of federally subsidized reinsurance.46 These two subsidies could reduce premiums to the
point at which low-income people would find the program attractive.
This could prevent selection problems, but the political barriers are formidable; existing insurers are unlikely to watch silently while large subsidies are directed solely to a new publicly organized competitor.
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Association plans — Proposals to authorize a different kind of pooling
approach, association health plans (AHPs), have been passed by the House
of Representatives in the last four Congresses and are likely to be considered again in 2005. The most recently passed bill (H.R. 4279 in the 108th
Congress) would have allowed an AHP formed by a trade or professional
organization to contract with health insurers to provide benefits to the AHP’s
member companies. (Larger AHPs would have been allowed to self insure.)
Many association plans already exist in both the small group and nongroup
markets and are offered by trade organizations and other entities.47 However, the insurance companies from which the associations buy coverage
are subject to state regulation. In addition, the insurers or the associations
themselves may engage in underwriting to hold premiums down. Under
the AHP proposal, insurers selling coverage to AHPs would be exempt
from state small group reform laws. That is, insurers could decide whether
or not to sell coverage to any particular AHP; could sell the AHP different
coverage from that made available to other AHPs or non-AHP small employers in the same state; and could offer AHP-specific rates regardless of
any community rating or rating-band rules in that state. (The AHP itself
could not discriminate against member companies, or individual employees of those companies, on the basis of health status.) The AHP would also
be exempt from most state-mandated benefit laws, which require that insurers cover specific providers or services.
Although the AHP proposal passed by the House was directed at small
employers (and possibly self-employed individuals), there are similar
proposals that would create association plans in the nongroup market.
Again, the plans would have to be open to anyone eligible to join the
association, but insurers could choose whether to work with the AHP
and could offer different rates to AHPs from those offered to other
nongroup buyers. President Bush’s FY 2006 budget proposal would make
AHPs available to civic, faith-based, and community organizations; although details are not yet available, this presumably is meant to support
AHPs targeted at individuals rather than employer groups.48
Proponents of AHPs contend that they would allow many small employers or individuals to band together and negotiate better prices for health
coverage. Exemption from state mandates and from consumer protections, such as state-established appeal rules, might also reduce costs,
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meaning that coverage would be more affordable for members. Opponents of small group AHPs contend that AHPs would split up the pool of
small group insurance buyers and would weaken the small group rating
reforms enacted by most states. If some types of businesses have healthier
workers than others, insurers could offer an AHP formed by those businesses better rates, whereas other small businesses in the state would be
left paying higher prices.49 Similar effects could be expected for nongroup
AHPs in the minority of states that have enacted nongroup rating regulation. Finally, some analysts question whether bringing multiple employers together will produce the anticipated administrative savings. The
American Academy of Actuaries has pointed out that an AHP would have
to perform all the administrative functions that a small group insurer
does for each participating employer, probably at the same cost.50 What
the AHP saved in premiums might have to be made up through an administrative fee charged by the AHP to its members.

Promoting Participation by Low-Risk People
Some people contend that the incentives for insurers to engage in underwriting would be reduced if larger numbers of low-risk people could be
encouraged to buy insurance. In this view, a tax credit or other subsidy
would make coverage more affordable and attractive for healthy people.
So many more low-risk applicants might enter the market that they could
more easily cross-subsidize the high-risk people who buy insurance now.
Whether this is true may depend in part on the generosity of the subsidy
relative to available premiums. If the subsidy is small and relatively few
new buyers enter the market, the ability of insurers to spread risks might
not be greatly affected. Moreover, the overall risk level of the insurance
pool would change only if many more low-risk people than high-risk
people entered the market as a result of the credit; whether this would
happen is uncertain.51
Broader participation in the market might also be encouraged by offering
lower-cost plans with reduced benefits. This is one of the rationales for
recent efforts to promote the sale of plans that combine a health savings
account (HSA) with a high-deductible insurance plan. However, even if
these plans did bring healthier people into the insurance market, improved
pooling might not result, for two reasons. First, some analysts contend
that healthier people would select HSAs and high-deductible plans,
whereas sicker people would continue to prefer more comprehensive coverage; the effect could be that the two groups would separate into different pools. Second, a high-deductible plan actually magnifies spending
differences between low-risk and high-risk people. Because low-risk
people would rarely reach the deductible, nearly all claims would be for
a few high-cost participants. An insurer selling high-deductible coverage
would thus have an even stronger incentive than other insurers to screen
out high-risk applicants.
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Another option that would assure greater participation by low-risk
people would be an “individual mandate”: a requirement that every
person obtain coverage. This was a key element of former President
Clinton’s health care plan, as well as of some competing congressional
proposals offered during the health care debate of 1993–1994. More recently, some form of mandate, accompanied by subsidies, has been
endorsed by a variety of groups, including the Progressive Policy Institute and the New America Foundation; the latter proposal has
reportedly attracted the attention of California’s Schwarzenegger administration.52 A less stringent alternative to a mandate, proposed by
Etheredge, among others, would provide for automatic enrollment with
an opt-out; uninsured people would automatically be assigned to subsidized insurance but could decline the coverage.53
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If everyone had to obtain coverage, insurers would no longer need to be
concerned about adverse selection: people who did and did not need costly
services would be equally likely to enroll. Unfortunately, this still would
not eliminate the incentive for insurers to engage in underwriting. No
matter how big the market is, the disparities in predictable costs for people
with and without known medical problems are so large that insurers
would still be able to profit from screening for high-risk applicants. So
long as any insurer in the market was underwriting, others would face
competitive pressure to follow suit.
Bringing low-risk people into the market, either through subsidies alone
or through subsidies plus a mandate could help make coverage more
accessible and affordable to high-risk applicants, but perhaps only in a
heavily regulated market. Risk spreading will occur only if insurers are
required to guarantee issue (so that low-risk and high-risk people are in
the same pool) and use community rating. Without subsidies, these reforms have apparently driven lower-risk buyers out of the market, leading to actual reductions in the number of people with coverage. Adding
subsidies may make these reforms more workable. Guaranteed issue and
community rating make healthier people pay more than their own expected costs; this arguably represents a sort of hidden tax, which an insurance subsidy could help offset.54

CONCLUSION
Insurance traditionally protects against the risk of unforeseeable losses.
Insurers do not sell fire insurance to people whose houses are already on
fire, or life insurance to people who are already terminally ill; nor, in an
unregulated market, do they sell health insurance at standard rates to
people who are already sick. Why are gaps in access to other kinds of
coverage not a matter of concern to policymakers, but limited access to
health insurance is a major issue?
The answer, of course, is that this society relies on health coverage, not just
to perform the classic function of insurance, but to ensure access to medical
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care and to help people with very high predictable—traditionally “uninsurable”—costs. There are other ways of advancing these goals that do not
involve insurance, such as increasing funding for community health centers and other sources of free care, or finding more equitable ways of
distributing the burden of uncompensated care among providers and/or
payers. If policymakers prefer to promote access to nongroup coverage for
high-risk people, it may be helpful to think of the issue not as an insurance
problem, but rather as one of finding fair and sustainable ways of subsidizing people who cannot afford to pay their own expected costs.
Regulatory approaches, such as requiring guaranteed issue or limiting
health-based rate variation, place the entire burden of subsidizing highrisk enrollees on lower-risk purchasers in the nongroup market. The result can be that healthier people leave the market, resulting in no net gain
in coverage. This problem might be alleviated if tax credits or other assistance to individual buyers reduce the effective premium to the point where
insurance remains attractive to low-risk people.
High-risk pools, because they are usually subsidized by group as well as
nongroup insurance buyers, spread the costs more broadly. But self-insured
employers are exempt from contributing, and revenues from insurer assessments have often been insufficient to reduce premiums to levels that
many high-risk applicants can afford. Broader-based subsidies could help,
but only if they are sustained over time. In addition, this approach requires
continued underwriting by insurers, which is both intrusive and costly.
Reinsurance, if it is funded solely by primary insurer contributions, simply shuffles costs among participating insurers and thus has the same drawback as rating reform: it requires that high-cost participants be subsidized
solely by low-cost participants. Again, this problem could be addressed by
drawing on external subsidies. However, reinsurance helps only with outlier costs (predictable or unpredictable). There would remain incentives to
screen out populations whose costs are routinely well above average.
Broader population pooling, through an FEHBP-like program or some
form of voluntary association plans, might produce economies of scale
that could lower prices for all participants. An FEHBP-like arrangement,
however, cannot offer affordable protection to high-risk people if it is in
competition with an unregulated nongroup market that continues to select the best risks. Voluntary pooling might be workable if there were
subsidies—such as an individual tax credit that could be used only for
pool premiums—to make the pool attractive to low-risk buyers. AHPs
may present the converse problem, siphoning off low-risk individuals or
groups and leaving only the higher risks in the ordinary market.
Finally, promoting participation by low-risk people—through premium
subsidies, lower-cost plans, or some form of individual mandate—might
make any of the other approaches more workable. But bringing low-risk
people into the market will not in itself improve access for high-risk people,
because there would remain incentives for insurers to fragment the pool.
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